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I. Introduction
This paper examines the potential impact of Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission upon content-based Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") regulations. Although
Citizens United focused on Federal Election Commission ("FEC")
regulations, the case reflects the various First Amendment doctrines
favored by the current Court, and its reasoning may extend to other
areas of regulated speech.
Part I of the paper will discuss several prominent areas of First
Amendment doctrine, as well as the roles of the FCC and the FEC.
Part II will briefly describe the background and outcome of Citizens
United. Finally, Part III will analyze several FCC regulations,
primarily regarding content and ownership, in light of the case.
* Elizabeth Elices is a graduate of Fordham University Law School, where she was
a Notes and Articles Editor for The Fordham Environmental Law Review and a member
of the Brendan Moore Trial Advocacy Center. The author wishes to thank her family for
their support throughout law school.
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II. Theoretical Foundations of the First Amendment, the
FCC, and the FEC
Political and legal scholars have advocated several prominent
theories on the purpose of the First Amendment. Justice Holmes and
Judge Learned Hand favored the "marketplace of ideas"
interpretation: the idea that the First Amendment is meant to
encourage a free exchange of opinions and information.! Others
focused on the importance of political speech and scientific
knowledge as necessary components of effective self-governance.2 In
contrast to the marketplace of ideas and political theory
understandings, some theorists view the First Amendment as
protection for individual expression, focusing on the right to speak
more than the right to listen.3 This theory of the purpose of the First
Amendment plays a less significant role in Citizens United.
The Federal Communications Commission regulates the
broadcast portion of the electromagnetic spectrum, including both
radio and television, for the sake of "public convenience, interest, or
necessity."' Other areas of media, including cable and satellite
television, also fall within the FCC's jurisdiction.! The FEC, created
in 1974, has jurisdiction over enforcement of federal campaign
finance laws.6 According to Justice Kennedy, the primary function of
the FEC is censorship. Justice Stevens, however, called this
"nonsense" in his dissent in Citizens United.'
1. MARK FRANKLIN, DAVID A. ANDERSON & LYRISSA BARNETT LIDSKY, MASS
MEDIA LAW 9-11 (7th ed. 2005).
2. Id. at 16-21; see Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute,
1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 252-57 (1961); NORMAN REDICH, JOHN ATTANASIO, & JOEL K.
GOLDSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 497, 503-04, (3d ed. 2005),
available at LEXIS.
3. FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 21-24; REDICH ET AL., supra note 2, at 504.
4. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2010).
5. United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 167-68 (1968); Cable Commc'ns
Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984); 47 U.S.C. § 152 (2010); 47 U.S.C. §
522 (2010); 47 U.S.C. § 338 (2010). There are many additional areas of FCC jurisdiction,
such as telephones, but these will not be discussed in this essay.
6. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, About the FEC, http://www.fec.gov/about
.shtml (last visited May 14, 2010).
7. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 896 (2010) ("Because the FEC's 'business
is to censor, there inheres the danger that [it] may well be less responsive than a court-
part of an independent branch of government-to the constitutionally protected interests
in free expression."' (citing Freedman v. Md., 380 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1965))).
8. Id. at 944, n.39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The majority opinion in Citizens United reflects a concern for the
health of the marketplace of ideas.' Justice Kennedy writes, "[I]t is
inherent in the nature of the political process that voters must be free
to obtain information from diverse sources in order to determine how
to cast their votes." 0
Justice Kennedy, in part II of the majority opinion, refers to
political speech as "speech that is central to the meaning and purpose
of the First Amendment."" This section was joined by Justices Alito,
Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas, but not by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Sotomayor.12 Justice Kennedy views speech as a key
aspect of the "integrity of the election process," questioning the
FEC's speech regulations." For Kennedy, the potential chilling effect
of these regulations is especially dangerous due to the censorship
function of the FEC.14
The dissent focuses on a variety of laws that restrict speakers
based on their identity, stating that the First Amendment is not
absolute." The dissent acknowledges the special importance of
political speech." However, the primary focus for the dissent is the
value of precedent and a strong government interest in reducing the
appearance of corruption in elections."
The majority opinion of Citizens United reflects the idea that
freedom of speech is a necessary component of self-governance. For
Kennedy and the Justices who share this view, laws impacting
political speech must be analyzed with the greatest possible suspicion,
and strict scrutiny will be applied. 9 According to this framework, the
First Amendment is "[p]remised on mistrust of governmental power,"
9. Id. at 896.
10. Id. at 899. Part II of this essay will discuss this in greater detail.
11. Id. at 892.
12. Id. at 886.
13. Id. at 895-96.
14. Id. at 896.
15. Id. at 945-48.
16. Id. at 946.
17. Id. at 929-82.
18. Id. at 898, 886 ("Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the
means to hold officials accountable to the people.").
19. Id. at 898.
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the fear being that such regulations may allow for favoring some
viewpoints over others. 20
III. Citizens United v. FEC
Section 441b, the regulation at issue in Citizens United, banned
express advocacy by any corporate entity within thirty days of a
primary election or sixty days of a general election. 2' This ban also
extended to broadcasts of electioneering communications.22 There
was an exception for political action committees, which the Court
describes as "burdensome alternatives" that did not overcome the
First Amendment concerns."23 For these reasons, the Court treated
the regulation of corporate expenditures in Section 441b as the
equivalent of banning speech.24
The case was about corporate expenditures, not corporate
campaign contributions.' The Court relied heavily on the reasoning
of Bellotti and Buckley, which addressed the constitutionality of
previous election regulations.26  In Buckley, the Supreme Court
invalidated certain campaign expenditure and contribution limits. 7 In
Bellotti, the Supreme Court invalidated a state law banning
independent corporate expenditures regarding any state
referendum.2 According to the Court in Citizens United, the essential
holding of both Bellotti and Buckley is that restriction of political
speech based on the corporate identity of the speaker is
unconstitutional.29  Quoting Bellotti, the Court writes that it is
unconstitutional to permit:
20. Id. at 882-83, 898-99. (The Court stated, "We find no basis for the proposition
that, in the context of political speech, the Government may impose restrictions on certain
disfavored speakers. Both history and logic lead to this conclusion.").
21. Id. at 897.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 897-98.
24. Id. at 898 ("As a 'restriction on the amount of money a person or group can
spend on political communication during a campaign,' [Section 441b] 'necessarily reduces
the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience reached."' (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
19 (1976))).
25. Id. at 909.
26. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22; First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
27. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 142; see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902.
28. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767; see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902.
29. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902.
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[L]egislative prohibition of speech based on the identity of the
interests that spokesmen may represent in public debate over
controversial issues and a requirement that the speaker have a
sufficiently great interest in the subject to justify
communication. .. In the realm of protected speech, the
legislature is constitutionally disqualified from dictating the
subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers who
may address a public issue.'
The Court in Citizens United recognizes that a subsequent
decision, Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, permitted
the regulation of corporate campaign expenditures." The Court
notes that Austin, as well as the cases and regulations that followed,
depend on three rationales: anti-distortion, anti-corruption, and the
protection of shareholders." The anti-distortion and anti-corruption
rationales reflect a concern that wealthy corporations and unions
might represent a disproportionate level of influence over elections,
damaging the integrity of the process." The shareholder protection
argument represents a fear that dissenting shareholders will be
compelled to fund corporate political speech.' The Court rejects the
shareholder argument, suggesting that corporate governance can
address this issue." The Court also rejects the anti-corruption and
anti-distortion arguments, overruling Austin in the process." On
other grounds, the Court finds that Section 441b may "have a chilling
effect extending well beyond the Government's interest in preventing
quid pro quo corruption.""
Reflecting the high value placed on political speech under the
First Amendment, the majority quotes Bellotti, writing that it is
"indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less
true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an
individual. ,8
30. Id. at 902 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784-85).
31. Id. at 903.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 902-11.
34. Id. at 911.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 904-11.
37. Id. at 908.
38. Id. at 904 (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777).
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The Court expressly upholds and extends the reasoning of Bellotti
and Buckley, and overrules Austin, writing:
Due consideration leads to this conclusion: Austin should be
and now is overruled. We return to the principle established
in Buckley and Bellotti that the Government may not suppress
political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate
identity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on
the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations."
The effect of Section 441 and Austin are of particular concern to
the Court.40 According to the Court, access to various viewpoints,
including those held by corporations, is a protected interest held by
the voters.41
IV. Potential Impact on FCC Regulations
A. Mandating Noncommercial Television
Cable operators are considered speakers in the sense that they
41exercise editorial control when deciding which channels to carry.
However, the Court has permitted regulations in this area that would
not be permissible in other mediums.43 Cable operators and satellite
providers are compelled to carry a minimum amount of
noncommercial programming." This falls within the "public interest"
justification for FCC regulations.45
The FCC issues licenses to noncommercial educational stations or
public broadcast stations which seek "primarily to serve the
educational needs of the community." 46 Congress and the FCC have
passed additional laws and regulations in this area that are arguably
content-based. This includes rules addressing the use of logos, 47
39. Id. at 913 (citation omitted).
40. Id. at 906 ("Austin interferes with the 'open marketplace' of ideas protected by
the First Amendment.").
41. Id. at 907.
42. Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc'ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494-95 (1986).
43. Id. at 496-97 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
44. 47 C.F.R. § 25.701(f) (2010) (governing satellite providers); 47 C.F.R. § 76.56
(2010) (governing cable companies).
45. 47 C.F.R. § 25.701(a) (2000) ("[Satellite] providers are subject to the public
interest obligations set forth . . . ").
46. 47 C.F.R. § 73.621(a) (2010); 47 U.S.C. § 397(6) (2010).
47. 47 U.S.C. § 399a (2010) (addressing the use of logos).
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symbols or other identifying marks of corporations that provide
financial support to these television stations,48 descriptions of
products and services, and endorsement of candidates for political
office.49
In Minority Television Project v. Federal Communications
Commission, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California addressed a First Amendment claim that certain
advertising restrictions placed on noncommercial educational
television stations by the FCC were facially unconstitutional.o These
regulations included a ban on any paid advocacy for or against a
particular viewpoint on a public issue or candidate for office, as well
as more traditional commercial advertisements.' Some of these
regulations are now codified into a statute that prohibits public
broadcast stations from offering commercial or political
advertisements.52
In addition, the plaintiff in Minority Television Project, a
noncommercial educational station, challenged regulations
promulgated by the FCC." The Court applied intermediate scrutiny,
upholding Section 399 as being "narrowly tailored to further a
substantial government interest."5 4
The court in Minority Television Project distinguished Section 399
and related regulations from the laws at issue in FEC v. Wisconsin
Right to Life." In Wisconsin Right to Life, the Supreme Court struck
down a portion of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 that
barred certain advertisements made by a nonprofit political advocacy
corporation." The Court in Wisconsin Right to Life applied strict
scrutiny." However, the court in Minority Television Project found
that an intermediate tier test was appropriate, and found that
48. 47 U.S.C. § 399b (regulating advertisements).
49. 47 U.S.C. § 399 (2010) (prohibiting endorsement of candidates).
50. Minority Television Project, Inc. v. FCC, 649 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1026 (N.D. Cal.
2009).
51. Id. at 1026-27.
52. 47 U.S.C. § 399b(a) (2010).
53. Minority Television Project, 649 F. Supp. 2d. at 1028.
54. Id. at 1030-31, 1048 (citing FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468
U.S. 364, 381-85 (1984)).
55. Id. at 1032-33.
56. FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007).
57. Id. at 464.
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encouraging noncommercial educational radio and television is a
substantial government interest.8
The governmental interest in protecting noncommercial
broadcasting is based on the content of the broadcasting, something
recognized by the court in Minority Television. "The FCC dedicated
these stations in this manner because of the 'high quality type of
programming which would be available to such stations-
programming of an entirely different character from that available on
most commercial stations.'"" The court recognized that the lack of
dependence on traditional advertising permits noncommercial
broadcasters to produce programming that differs in substantial ways
from traditional commercial broadcasters.6 For this reason, the court
upheld the rules and regulations regarding advertising and
endorsements on noncommercial stations.6 ' The court directly
addressed the ban on advocacy advertisements, stating that
permitting those types of advertisements would endanger the
independence of noncommercial broadcasters, potentially changing
their programming.62 It is important to note, however, that this
decision related to paid endorsements of candidates; noncommercial
broadcasters are free to editorialize and express support for
candidates or political causes as long as no money is exchanged.
B. Must-Carry Obligations
The FCC's rules and regulations require cable operators to carry
a specified number of local commercial and noncommercial television
stations.( For example, 47 U.S.C. § 534 provides:
58. Minority Television, 649 F. Supp. 2d at 1033.
59. Id. at 1033 (citing Nat'1 Pub. Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 226, 227 (D.C. Cir.
2001)).
60. Id. at 1037 ("Congress also heard evidence that the advertising prohibitions were
necessary to preserve the unique programming presented by public stations . . . Public
radio also provides four hours of daily news of a different nature than that provided by
commercial stations . . . '[P]ublic television is the primary source of children's educational
programming in the United States."') (citation omitted).
61. Id. at 1042.
62. Id. at 1041.
63. FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364, 381-85 (1984).
64. STUART MINOR BENJAMIN, DOUGLAS GARY LICHTMAN, HOWARD
SHELANSKI, & PHILIP J. WEISER, TELECOMMS. L. & POL'Y, 513 (2d ed. 2006); 47 U.S.C. §
534 (2010) (requiring carriage of local commercial stations); 47 U.S.C. § 535 (2010)
(requiring carriage of noncommercial stations).
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Each cable operator shall carry, on the cable system of that
operator, the signals of local commercial television stations
and qualified low power stations as provided by this section.
Carriage of additional broadcast television signals on such
system shall be at the discretion of such operator, subject to
[47 U.S.C. § 325(b)].
It is significant to note that these must-carry rules and regulations
require cable operators to carry a specified number of local
commercial channels, as well as all programming of those channels
without alteration.' There are also must-carry obligations for
satellite providers, but they do not function in the same manner.'
Regulations governing the retransmission of broadcast signals by
cable providers are codified in 47 C.F.R. Sections 76.51 through 76.70.
These regulations raised First Amendment concerns, which have
been addressed by the Supreme Court.'
In a pair of significant decisions, known as Turner I and Turner 11,
the Supreme Court addressed the must-carry requirements of the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992.69 In Turner I, the Court recognized cable operators as First
Amendment speakers, both through programs created by the cable
operators and by exercising editorial discretion when choosing which
channels to offer as part of their service.70 The Court found that there
was adequate reason to apply a different level of scrutiny because of
technological differences between broadcast television and cable
television, including the scarcity of broadcast channels as opposed to
cable channels.7 ' The Court rejected the argument that these types of
regulations are merely economic and do not impact speech interests,
and therefore refused to apply a rational basis test.72 In Turner I, the
65. 47 U.S.C. § 534(a).
66. 47 U.S.C. § 534(a)-(c) (2010); see 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(3)(B) (2010)(providing that
cable operators "shall carry the entirety of the program schedule of any television station
carried on the cable system unless carriage of specific programming is prohibited, and
other programming authorized to be substituted . . . ").
67. BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 64, at 513; 47 U.S.C. § 338 (2010). See also supra
part III.A.
68. See infra p. 13.
69. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) ("Turner "); Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) ("Turner II").
70. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 636-37.
71. Id. at 636-39.
72. Id. at 640-41.
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primary task for the Court was to determine whether must-carry
regulations are a content-based or content-neutral regulation of
speech." If they are content-neutral, they receive intermediate
scrutiny.74 This is based on the O'Brien test, that ". . . [A] content-
neutral regulation will be sustained if: it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest."" Although it recognized
that these rules do not impact editorial discretion, the Supreme Court
held that must-carry rules are content-neutral, although it recognized
that these rules do impact editorial discretion. The Court remanded
for further factual findings.
The Supreme Court in Turner I focused both on the purpose of
the First Amendment in protecting the interests of speaker as well as
the value of the marketplace of ideas. 8 In a split decision in Turner
II, the Supreme Court again upheld the must-carry provisions."
In her dissent in Turner II, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, wrote that "'appellees'
characterization of must-carry as a means of protecting these stations,
like the Court's explicit concern for promoting 'community self-
expression' and the 'local origination of broadcast programming,'
reveals a content-based preference for broadcast programming."'
Within the context of advocacy, the Supreme Court in Citizens
United ruled that the purpose of the First Amendment is not to
73. Id. at 642-43.
74. Id. at 642.
75. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367(1968).
76. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 643-52.
77. Id. at 668.
78. Id. at 641. ("At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each
person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression,
consideration, and adherence. Our political system and cultural life rest upon this ideal ...
Government action that stifles speech on account of its message, or that requires the
utterance of a particular message favored by the Government, contravenes this essential
right. Laws of this sort pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a
legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate
the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion. These restrictions 'raise the
specter that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the
marketplace."' (citations omitted).
79. Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997).
80. Id. at 234 (citation omitted).
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equalize the ability to speak." One of the major justifications for
must-carry provisions is to promote local broadcasters.' In the past,
the Supreme Court has found that these provisions were content-
neutral. However, based on the Court's analysis in Citizens United, it
is not clear that the Court would analyze the must-carry obligations in
the same manner.
C. Areas of Overlap: Sections 312 and 315 of the Communications Act
Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act states that the FCC
may revoke a license "for willful or repeated failure to allow
reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of
time for the use of a broadcasting station, other than a non-
commercial educational broadcast station, by a legally qualified
candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy." 83
Section 312(a)(7) requires broadcasters to permit legally qualified
candidates to purchase or access airtime.Y This is based on a
reasonableness standard, and broadcasters may consider several
factors before deciding whether or not to sell airtime or permit
access.5 These factors include the disruptiveness of the requested
programming and the number of potential candidates who may
request similar amounts of airtime.8
The First Amendment and Section 312(a)(7) do not guarantee a
right to use the broadcast facilities of FCC licensees, only that
qualifying candidates must have the same access to those facilities.
They have the right to purchase access; it is not merely given to
them."
The Court has recognized especially strong First Amendment
interests in this area, stating:
The First Amendment interests of candidates and voters, as
well as broadcasters, are implicated by § 312(a)(7). We have
recognized that "it is of particular importance that candidates
81. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904 (2010) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 49 (1976)).
82. See generally Turner I, 512 U.S. at 333-36; Turner II, 520 U.S. at 201-05.
83. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (2010).
84. Id.; Levinson, 9 FCC Rcd. 3018,3018 (1994).
85. Levinson, 9 FCC Rcd. at 3019.
86. Id. (citing Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 387 (1981)).
87. Columbia Broad. Sys., 453 U.S. at 381-82, 382 n.7.
88. Id. at 382.
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have the . .. opportunity to make their views known so that
the electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates'
personal qualities and their positions on vital public issues
before choosing among them on election day." Indeed,
"speech concerning public affairs is . .. the essence of self-
government." The First Amendment "has its fullest and most
urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for
political office." Section 312(a)(7) thus makes a significant
contribution to freedom of expression by enhancing the ability
of candidates to present, and the public to receive,
information necessary for the effective operation of the
democratic process.'
In recognizing these First Amendment interests, opinions may
vary widely on whose interests will receive the most weight. Years of
case law focused on the interests of the voting public in hearing
speech indicate a possibility that the Court may begin focusing more
attention on the interests of speakers, both as candidates or advocacy
groups and as broadcasters.
Section 315 of the Communications Act, with its roots in Section
18 of the 1927 Radio Act, is known as the "Equal Time Rule.""0 This
applies to broadcast television, as well as to channels for which a
cable operator or satellite provider is the "originator" or has exclusive
control over all content." The rule states:
No cable television system is required to permit the use of its
facilities by any legally qualified candidate for public office,
but if any system shall permit any such candidate to use its
facilities, it shall afford equal opportunities to all other
candidates for that office to use such facilities. Such system
shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast
by any such candidate. . .. In making time available to
candidates for public office, no system shall make any
discrimination between candidates in practices, regulations,
facilities, or services for or in connection with the service
89. Id. at 396 (citations omitted).
90. BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 64, at 227-28; 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2010).
91. BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 64, at 246-47; Use of Broadcast and Cable Facilities
by Candidates for Public Office, 34 F.C.C. 2d 510 (1972); Implementation of Section 25 of
the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992: Direct Broadcast
Satellite Public Interest Obligations, 19 FCC Rcd. 5647 (2004).
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rendered pursuant to this part, or make or give any preference
to any candidate for public office or subject any such
candidate to any prejudice or disadvantage; nor shall any
system make any contract or other agreement which shall
have the effect of permitting any legally qualified candidate
for any public office to cablecast to the exclusion of other
legally qualified candidates for the same public office.'
This means that any broadcaster that permits a qualified
candidate to use its station must permit qualified opposing candidates
to use the stations as well, under similar terms." Stations are not
required to sell the exact same timeslot to opposing candidates,
although offering significantly different timeslots may raise
concerns.
It is significant to note that Section 315 is not the same as the
Fairness Doctrine.' Section 315 requires broadcasters to treat all
qualified candidates the exact same way in terms of access to
broadcast facilities." In contrast, the Fairness Doctrine was issue-
oriented and addressed the public's right to access different
viewpoints.' The FCC abandoned the Fairness Doctrine in 1985.98
92. 47 C.F.R. § 76.205 (2010). Although the regulations referring to broadcast
television and satellite television are not included here, the language for each is the same.
See 47 C.F.R. § 25.701(i) (2010); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1941 (2010).
93. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 382 n.7 (1981). The definition of
"legally qualified candidate" is codified at 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(q):
(1) Any person who:
(i) Has publicly announced his or her intention to run for nomination or
office;
(ii) Is qualified under the applicable local, State or Federal law to hold
the office for which he or she is a candidate; and
(iii) Has met the qualifications set forth in either paragraphs (q)( 2 ), (3)
or (4) of this section. [...]
Subsections (q)(2),(3), and (4) address candidates for Presidency and Vice Presidency,
including within primary elections.
94. Grace, 40 F.C.C. 297 (1958).
95. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 185-86, n.21
(1973); Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973); Scherer, 44 F.C.C. 2d 21, 23 (1973).
96. Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323, 328-30 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
97. Id.
98. Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.
2d 142 (1985); Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, 5043 (1987) ("Based upon
compelling evidence of record, the Commission, in its 1985 Fairness Report, concluded
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The abandonment of the Fairness Doctrine did not end the validity of
Section 315, and Section 315 does not mandate the Fairness
Doctrine.
After Citizens United, efforts to revive the Fairness Doctrine may
prove especially difficult. In addition to technological changes
increasing the number of television channels and likely weakening the
scarcity rationale behind the Fairness Doctrine, the Court's analysis
in Citizens United may prove to be the final blow." While addressing
concerns that wealthy corporations may have a disproportionate
ability to produce political advertisements, the Court held that the
purpose of the First Amendment is not to equalize the ability to
impact elections.'o'
Section 315 applies to individual candidates, not political
parties.'" Additionally, as an individual right, Section 315 applies to
candidates themselves and not their supporters.o" Citizens United is
primarily concerned with the First Amendment rights of
corporations, but also with the individuals that form a corporation,
implying that regulation of corporate advocacy advertisements were
that the fairness doctrine disserved the public interest. Evaluating the explosive growth in
the number and types of information sources available in the marketplace, the
Commission found that the public has 'access to a multitude of viewpoints without the
need or danger of regulatory intervention.' The Commission also determined that the
fairness doctrine 'chills' speech, finding that 'in stark contravention of its purpose, [the
doctrine] operates as a pervasive and significant impediment to the broadcasting of
controversial issues of public importance.' In addition, the agency found that its
enforcement of the doctrine acts to inhibit the expression of unpopular opinion; it places
the government in the intrusive role of scrutinizing program content; it creates the
opportunity for abuse for partisan political purposes; and it imposes unnecessary costs
upon both broadcasters and the Commission.") (footnotes omitted).
99. Ark. AFL-CIO v. FCC, 11 F.3d 1430, 1436-37 (8th Cir. 1993); Meredith Corp. v.
FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 873 n.11 (1987); Telecomms. Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801
F.2d 501, 504, 517-18 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987) (holding that the
Fairness Doctrine had been established by the FCC and was not codified by Congress in
Section 315).
100. In Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Fairness Doctrine, in part relying on the FCC's mandate to regulate the airwaves in
the public interest, as well as the nature of the broadcast spectrum. 395 U.S. 367, 385-89
(1969). However, the Court refused to extend this reasoning to the newspaper industry in
a challenge to a state law similar to the Fairness Doctrine. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 244, 258 (1974).
101. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904 (2010).
102. Greater N.Y.C. Broad. Corp., 40 F.C.C. 235, 236 (1946); Daly, 40 F.C.C. 302, 302
(1959); Nat'l Laugh Party, 40 F.C.C. 289, 289 (1957); Dermer, 40 F.C.C. 407, 407 (1964);
Use of Broadcast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 24 F.C.C. 2d 832, 838 (1970).
103. Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc., 186 F.2d 1, 3 (3d Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 909 (1951).
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not only violations of the freedom of speech, but also impacted
associational rights.1 O It is possible that this concern for associational
rights may lead to stronger protection for the First Amendment rights
of political parties.
D. Ownership Regulations
In Citizens United, the majority is concerned that "[s]peech
restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often
simply a means to control content.",05 In the context of FCC
regulations, the relationship between the identity of the speaker and
the content of their speech is assumed; it is the basis for many
ownership regulations."6 The FCC has listed three overall purposes
for ownership regulations: "diversity, competition, and localism.""o
The FCC has promulgated a series of regulations regarding cross-
ownership of media within communities, and horizontal and vertical
integration of media corporationsY8 The Telecommunications Act of
1996 in part requires the FCC to review its ownership regulations to
determine whether they serve the public interest." Limitations on
owning multiple media outlets such as radio stations, newspapers, and
television stations within the same defined region have been upheld
as falling within the public interest.no This has been based on the
scarcity of broadcast spectrum in both radio and television, as well as
the interest in preserving diversity of viewpoints."
104. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908 ("Yet certain disfavored associations of
citizens-those that have taken on the corporate form-are penalized for engaging in the
same political speech.").
105. Id. at 899.
106. See generally Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of the
Commission Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television
Broadcast Stations, 22 FCC Rcd. 2d 306 (1970).
107. Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules
Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Cross-
Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspapers, Rules and Policies Concerning
Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Markets, Definition of Radio
Markets, 18 FCC Rcd. 13620, 13627 (2003).
108. BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 64, at 389-408; 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (outlining the
regulatory framework for cross-media ownership in a given location).
109. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56, 110
(1996).
110. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 401-02 (3d Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 545 U.S. 1123 (2005).
111. Id.
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However, although the FCC regulations are designed to increase
the number of speakers, the majority in Citizens United addresses a
concern that FEC regulations will decrease the number of speakers.H2
The FCC regulates ownership of broadcast television stations and
terrestrial radio stations due to fears of both unfair market power and
the danger of one entity controlling the availability of information in
a given area."' There is a concern that if one entity owns all or most
media outlets in a region, the public will only have access to one
viewpoint."' This concern assumes a link exists between station
ownership and content.
The majority in Citizens United cites, with apparent approval, the
dissent in United States v. Automobile Workers, writing, "the dissent
concluded that deeming a particular group 'too powerful' was not a
'justificatio[n] for withholding First Amendment rights from any
group-labor or corporate.""' While FCC ownership regulations are
not direct regulation of speech, their function is to reduce the amount
of speech controlled by any one corporation. However, the FCC
regulations are designed to increase the number of speakers, while
the FEC regulation in question had the opposite effect. The possible
application of Citizens United to FCC ownership regulations will
depend on whether the focus becomes the rights of the speaker or the
rights of the listeners to a vibrant marketplace of ideas.
V. Conclusion
The regulatory decisions of the FCC will be given a high level of
deference by the courts."6 Regulations that may be at least arguably
content-based are routinely upheld. However, the content-neutrality
112. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010).
113. BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 64, at 403-08; FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 1, at
201-02, 218-20. See also Telecommunications Act.
114. BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 64, at 403-08; FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 1, at
218-20.
115. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 901 (citing U.S. v. Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 597
(1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
116. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 390 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[T]he
traditional APA standard of review is even more deferential 'where the issues involve
elusive and not easily defined areas such as programming diversity in broadcasting.' Yet
even when an administrative order involves policy determinations on such elusive goals, a
'rationality' standard is appropriate. Additionally, when an agency has engaged in line-
drawing determinations and our review is necessarily deferential to agency expertise, its
decisions may not be 'patently unreasonable' or run counter to the evidence before the
agency.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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of must-carry obligations was determined in a split decision."'
Changes in the composition of the Court, technological
advancements, and changes within the media industry all have the
potential to affect similar claims.
It is difficult to determine whether the Citizens United decision
will have a significant impact outside election law jurisprudence. Its
relevance in telecommunications may not be in direct application, but
may serve as a guide to how the current Supreme Court may analyze
media regulation in the future.
117. Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997).
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